I’m delighted to share a new article by yours truly on corporate governance and shareholder activism, The Golden Leash and the Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty, that will be published in the UCLA Law Review.
The “golden leash” is a controversial form of third-party compensation under which activist hedge funds supplement the salaries of directors they nominate to the board, in exchange for increasing the value of the company. A director compensated pursuant to such an arrangement stands to earn millions of dollars rather than the $250,ooo paid to a typical director of a large public company, though the more richly compensated director usually works much harder and takes a lot of public abuse.
I offer a qualified defense of the golden leash, situating it in the context of other, more mainstream structures that depend on a more relaxed, porous conception of the fiduciary duty of loyalty than is commonly applied in the context of the golden leash. I also offer thoughts on how a properly disclosed golden leash can not only work for shareholders but improve procedural corporate governance more broadly.
The abstract follows. I welcome any comments on the draft.